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Abstract—We present Communix, a collaborative deadlock
immunity framework for Java programs. Deadlock immunity
enables applications to avoid deadlocks that they previously
encountered. Dimmunix [1], our deadlock immunity system,
detects deadlocks and saves their signatures at runtime, then
avoids execution flows that match these signatures; a signature
is an abstraction of the execution flow that led to deadlock.
Dimmunix needs all the deadlock bugs in an application to
manifest, in all possible ways, in order to provide full protection
against deadlocks for that application. Communix addresses
this shortcoming by distributing the deadlock signatures pro-
duced by Dimmunix. The signatures of a deadlock can protect
against the deadlock any user connected to the Internet and
running the same application, even if he/she did not experience
the deadlock yet. Besides signature distribution, Communix
provides signature validation and generalization. Signature val-
idation ensures that the incoming signatures match the target
applications, and protect the users against malicious signatures.
Signature generalization keeps the repository of deadlock
signatures compact, by merging multiple deadlock signatures
into one signature. Communix is application agnostic, i.e., it is
applicable to any Java application. Communix is efficient and
scalable, and can effectively protect Java applications against
malicious signatures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Failure immunization techniques protect the programs
against a specific bug or vulnerability exploit by learning
from its past manifestations. We use the term “failure” to
denote a manifestation of the bug. An immunization system
detects the failure, extracts its fingerprint, and uses it to
avoid reoccurrences of the same bug. We call this fingerprint
“bug signature”. A bug signature is an approximation of the
execution flow that led to the failure. For instance, Dimmu-
nix detects deadlocks at runtime and generates signatures to
avoid reoccurrences of the same deadlocks.
Failure immunization systems avoid only manifestations
of previously encountered bugs; a bug must manifest at least
once for the application to be protected against it. Therefore,
the false positives rate is low, because only manifestations of
real bugs are avoided. A false positive is the situation where
a failure is avoided with no reason, i.e., the failure could not
have occurred, even without any avoidance. However, there
are false negatives (i.e., bugs against which the application
is unprotected) until all the bugs manifest.
One possible solution to address the aforementioned
drawback is collaborative immunization via distribution of
bug signatures. More specifically, once a user encounters
a bug, the bug’s signature is automatically generated and
distributed to other users through the Internet. Therefore,
each bug needs to be encountered once, by any user, then
the other users get protected against the bug, without having
to experience it.
We present Communix, a collaborative immunization
framework that enables Java programs running on different
machines to immunize each other against deadlock bugs.
Communix provides three services: signature distribution,
signature validation, and signature generalization.
To distribute deadlock signatures, Communix uses an im-
munity server; client machines upload signatures discovered
by Dimmunix to the server, and periodically retrieve the
new signatures from the server. Each time a Java application
starts on a client machine, Communix selects from these
signatures the ones that are valid for that application and, if
possible, it generalizes existing deadlock signatures.
Communix is efficient and scalable. In §IV, we show that
the server can process efficiently 30,000 simultaneous re-
quests, at a rate of 9,000 requests per second. The agent can
analyze 1,000 new deadlock signatures in 2-3 seconds (§IV).
We present two scenarios that illustrate the benefit of
frameworks like Communix. In the first scenario, the user
opens a web page, and the browser deadlocks while ren-
dering the content of the page, due to a Java applet. The
user shuts down the browser, then restarts it and opens the
same page. If the browser is equipped with Dimmunix [1],
it will successfully open the page; if not, it might deadlock
again. However, it may be undesirable to have the browser
deadlocking in the first place. Even the first occurrence of the
deadlock may have severe consequences: the browser might
be in the middle of some important operation, like purchas-
ing an expensive product, or booking a flight. Therefore, a
framework like Communix that prevents other users from
encountering the deadlock in the first place is beneficial. In
the second scenario, a deadlock-prone version of a plugin
is released for the Eclipse IDE, which makes Eclipse hang.
If the plugin has multiple deadlock bugs, each user has to
encounter all these deadlocks for Dimmunix to be able to
avoid them. Sharing the signatures of the deadlocks with
users who just installed the plugin is useful; these users will
not experience any deadlocks while using the plugin if all
deadlocks have already been encountered by some users.
The contributions of this work are: First, Communix
transparently distributes signatures over the Internet, to pre-
vent other users from encountering deadlock bugs. Second,
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Communix finds concise signatures of a deadlock by using
the collective knowledge of all the nodes in the Internet
that run the same application. Communix provides the above
features while protecting the Java applications against DoS
attacks that attempt to exploit Dimmunix by providing fake
deadlock signatures.
This paper is organized as follows: We provide back-
ground information in §II, describe the design of Communix
in §III, evaluate Communix in §IV, present related work
in §V, and conclude in §VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly present Dimmunix (§II-A),
and introduce concepts related to collaborative deadlock
immunity (§II-B).
A. Dimmunix
Programs augmented with Dimmunix develop antibodies
against each deadlock they encounter: Dimmunix extracts
the signature of the deadlock, stores it in a persistent
history, then alters future thread schedules transparently to
the application, in order to avoid execution flows matching
the signature. A signature approximates the execution flow
leading to deadlock. With every newly encountered dead-
lock, the program’s resistance to deadlocks is improved.
Hence, deadlock signatures constitute effective antibodies
against deadlock bugs.
A deadlock signature consists of (1) the call stacks
the deadlocked threads had when they acquired the locks
involved in the deadlock and (2) the call stacks of the
deadlocked threads at the moment of the deadlock. We call
the former “outer call stacks” and the latter “inner call
stacks”; we call the top frames of these call stacks “outer”
and respectively “inner” lock statements. A deadlock bug is
uniquely delimited by the outer and inner lock statements.
Dimmunix used to keep only the outer call stacks in a
signature [1]; we made it keep also the inner call stacks,
in order to have an accurate localization of the deadlock
bug within the signature. The accuracy of a signature is
directly proportional to the length of the call stack suffixes.
A deadlock bug can have multiple signatures, each of them
corresponding to a different manifestation of the deadlock.
Dimmunix consists of two components: (1) an avoidance
module that prevents reoccurrences of previously encoun-
tered deadlocks, and (2) a detection module that detects
deadlocks, extracts their signatures, and adds them to a
persistent history. Dimmunix requires no assistance from
programmers or users, and can be used by users to defend
against deadlocks while waiting for a vendor patch. Dim-
munix runs within the address space of the target program.
Before each lock acquisition, the avoidance module de-
cides whether to allow the running thread to proceed with the
lock acquisition. Avoiding deadlocks requires anticipating
whether the lock acquisition would lead to the instantiation
of a signature from the deadlock history. For a signature with
outer call stacks CS1, ..., CSn to be instantiated, there must
exist threads t1, ...,tn that either hold or are block waiting
for locks l1, ..., ln while having call stacks CS1, ...,CSn. If
no signature from the deadlock history can be instantiated,
the avoidance module allows the caller thread to proceed
with the lock acquisition; otherwise, it suspends the thread
until the lock acquisition cannot cause any instantiation of
a signature from the history.
B. Collaborative Deadlock Immunity
In collaborative deadlock immunity, different machines
connected to the Internet work together to achieve immunity
against deadlocks by sharing their deadlock signatures.
An important benefit of sharing the deadlock signatures
is that any application can use the collective knowledge
of the other nodes to generalize deadlock signatures from
its history. The generalization consists of merging different
signatures of the same deadlock bug. The role of signature
generalization is to keep few signatures per deadlock bug,
in order to have a small size of the deadlock history for
each application. If all possible manifestations of a deadlock
bug D were experienced by some nodes in the Internet, the
current signatures of D are the most accurate signatures that
enable Dimmunix to avoid all the manifestations of D.
Upon receiving a signature from other nodes, Communix
checks whether the signature can be used by the running
application. This first validation step assumes the node that
sent the signature is honest.
Attackers may send fake deadlock signatures that do
not represent real deadlock bugs; these signatures may
cause denial of service (DoS) in applications instrumented
with Dimmunix. Such signatures may exploit Dimmunix to
increase the runtime overhead of signature matching and
reduce the parallelism due to suspending threads. The vali-
dation process should prevent such signatures from harming
the performance or the functionality of the applications.
Therefore, additional checks are performed (§III-C).
III. DESIGN
In this section, we describe the architecture of the Com-
munix framework (§III-A), explain the signature distribu-
tion (§III-B), and describe in detail the signature valida-
tion (§III-C) and signature generalization (§III-D).
A. Communix Framework
Communix has five components, as we illustrate in Fig-
ure 1: Dimmunix (i.e., the deadlock immunization compo-
nent of Communix), Communix plugin, Communix server,
Communix client, and Communix agent. Dimmunix is in
charge of (1) detecting deadlocks, (2) saving their corre-
sponding signatures into the running application’s deadlock
history, and (3) preventing the application from encountering
the same deadlocks again.
Communix uses a centralized signature distribution frame-
work. The Communix plugin, implemented on top of
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Dimmunix, sends the deadlock signatures to the Commu-
nix server, right after Dimmunix produces the signatures.
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Figure 1. Communix architecture.
In order to obtain new
deadlock signatures from
the server, a machine must
have the Communix client
installed; the client period-
ically downloads the new
deadlock signatures from
the server into a local
repository. Any Java appli-
cation running with Dim-
munix can use these signatures to improve its protection
against deadlocks.
A centralized signature distribution improves the protec-
tion against deadlocks for all the machines connected to
the Internet that are equipped with Communix. Each newly
discovered signature S becomes available to any machine
connected to the Internet; as soon as other nodes download S
from the Communix server and validate it, they are protected
against deadlock manifestations matching S, without having
to encounter S.
The client-side signature validation and signature gener-
alization are performed by the Communix agent. The agent
runs together with Dimmunix, in a Java application’s address
space. When the application starts, the agent selects from
the local repository the new signatures that are valid, i.e.,
that can be used by the application. If a new signature S is
found valid, the agent attempts to merge S with an existing
signature from the running application’s deadlock history. If
S cannot be merged with any existing signature, then it repre-
sents a new deadlock bug; the agent adds S to the history, in
order to prevent future occurrences of deadlocks matching S.
To validate a new deadlock signature, the Communix
agent checks whether the signature matches the running ap-
plication. In addition, Communix protects the users against
DoS attacks based on distributing malicious signatures. To
generalize deadlock signatures, Communix merges signa-
tures representing the same deadlock bug into one signature.
This paper focuses on deadlock bugs; however, a similar
collaborative immunity framework can be imagined for other
bugs, like data races and atomicity violations.
B. Signature Distribution
Communix allows different users running the same ap-
plication (or different applications sharing some deadlock-
prone library) to share signatures. The more users run some
deadlock-prone code, the more likely it is that all possible
manifestations of the deadlock bug are experienced in a short
period of time, and all users get fully immunized against the
deadlock.
Once Dimmunix detects a deadlock, the Communix plu-
gin sends the corresponding signature to the Communix
server. The Communix server collects in a database all the
deadlock signatures discovered by Java applications running
with Dimmunix on arbitrary machines connected to the
Internet. To decide whether to add an incoming signature
to the database, the server performs a simple signature
validation, described in §III-C2.
The Communix client, running on an arbitrary machine
in the Internet, periodically downloads the new deadlock
signatures from the server into a local repository. The local
repository is updated once a day; a high frequency (e.g., once
a minute) would overload the Communix server. The updates
are incremental, i.e., the client requests from the server only
the signatures that are not present in the local repository.
When a Java application A starts, the Communix agent
inspects the new signatures from the local repository: the
agent checks the validity of each new signature S (§III-C3);
if S is valid, the agent adds S to A’s deadlock history. The
inspection of the local repository is incremental, i.e., every
signature is analyzed only once.
The Communix client runs as a background process,
decoupled from the agent. Without this decoupling, the
Communix agent would have to connect to the server and re-
trieve new deadlock signatures every time a Java application
starts. This would introduce an unnecessary overhead.
Note that Communix does not require users to provide
any application specific information (like name or version)
with the signatures they share. Communix only needs hash
values of class bytecodes, in order to distinguish different
versions of the same class or different classes having the
same name. The hash values are automatically computed
by the Communix plugin, when Dimmunix produces the
signatures. This makes Communix application agnostic.
C. Signature Validation
Before sending a signature to the server, the Communix
plugin attaches to each call stack frame of the signature the
hash of the class bytecode containing that frame.
Each time a Java application running Dimmunix starts,
the Communix agent selects from the local repository the
signatures that match the running application. The agent
checks whether the hashes of an incoming signature match
the bytecode hashes of the running application. If the hashes
do not match for all the top frames, the signature is rejected;
otherwise, the agent keeps from the signature the longest call
stack suffixes with hashes matching the application.
If all nodes were honest, the above check would have
been sufficient; unfortunately, there are attackers that may try
to exploit Dimmunix by sending fake signatures, therefore
additional checks are needed.
1) Preventing (Containing) DoS Attacks: An attacker
may attempt to perform a performance DoS attack based on
signature flooding, to put pressure on Dimmunix’s signature
matching mechanism. Such an attack consists of sending
many fake signatures that manage to pass the validation and
get accepted into the deadlock history of an application.
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This would put pressure on Dimmunix, because all these
signatures have to be matched at runtime.
Communix manages to prevent such attacks by per-
forming three additional checks. The first two checks are
performed by the server, and the third one is performed by
the Communix agent, on the client side. If any of these
checks fails, the signature is rejected.
First, the server requires each incoming signature to be
accompanied by an encrypted id of the sender. The encrypted
id is provided once by the Communix server. The server uses
the sender ids to bind each incoming signature to the user
who sent the signature. Since an attacker can fake many IP
addresses, they cannot be used to identify the senders; it
must be hard for an attacker to obtain multiple ids.
Second, the server makes sure that every two distinct
signatures sent by the same user (i.e., having the same sender
id) have no common top frames. This restriction should not
affect honest users, because it is not likely that a user would
experience such “adjacent” deadlocks. However, if he/she
does experience such situations, the signatures wrongly re-
jected due to this restriction can be provided by other users.
Third, the agent checks whether the outer call stacks of a
new signature end in nested synchronized blocks/methods.
Checking whether a synchronized block/method is nested is
straightforward, due to the disciplined way the Java compiler
nests these constructs. We describe the algorithm in §III-C3.
Communix does not handle explicit lock/unlock operations
(e.g., calls to ReentrantLock.lock/unlock()). However, this
is a minor deficiency, since Java programs use mostly
synchronized blocks/methods (§IV).
Thanks to the above three checks, the possibility to flood
Dimmunix with fake signatures is limited. If there are N
nested synchronized blocks/methods in a Java application
A, an attacker cannot “provide” more than N signatures that
get accepted into A’s deadlock history. Typically, in a Java
application there are a few hundred nested synchronized
blocks/methods (§IV). Therefore, an attacker cannot force
more than a few hundred signatures into the deadlock history
of an application.
Another type of performance DoS attack that an attacker
may attempt is to send fake signatures that slow down
an application. These attacks force Dimmunix to avoid
instantiations of fake signatures or signatures that are too
general. The more general a signature is, the more often
Dimmunix has to avoid instantiations of the signature. This
means Dimmunix suspends threads more often then needed,
which may considerably slow down the application. The
attacker may exploit the generalization mechanism to retain
only the top frames of the outer call stacks, or send directly
signatures with outer call stacks of depth 1.
The Communix agent prevents the attackers from sending
signatures with outer call stacks of depth < 5. For the appli-
cations we studied, the outer call stacks have large depths
(usually > 10); therefore, we believe that this restriction does
not affect the honest users. Signatures with outer call stacks
of depth 5 incur an acceptable performance overhead; for
depth 1, the overhead is considerable (§IV-B). Therefore,
the outer call stacks must have the depth ≥ 5. To prevent
an attacker from exploiting the signature generalization
mechanism to obtain outer call stacks of depth 1, the agent
does not merge signatures below depth 5, for the outer
call stacks. Alternatively, one could compute the minimal
depth d that outer call stacks corresponding to a nested
synchronized block/method can have; the threshold would
be min(d,5), rather than 5, in this case.
The third check ensures that the worst damage an attacker
can do is to force into the deadlock history of an application
signatures with outer call stacks of depth 5, that cover all the
nested synchronized blocks/methods. We show in §IV that
such a scenario causes only 8-40% performance overhead in
the Java applications we studied.
An attacker may also attempt a functionality DoS attack
that disables features of an application. If a certain feature
needs some code to execute concurrently, that feature would
no longer be available, if Dimmunix makes the code execute
sequentially. This undesired effect can be caused also by
real deadlock signatures; some concurrent code may be
deadlock-prone, and execute most of the time without dead-
locking. To prevent such situations, we use Dimmunix’ false
positive detection mechanism. If after 100 instantiations of a
signature S there was no true positive, and there was at least
one interval of 1 second having more than 10 instantiations
of S, Dimmunix decides to warn the user about signature S;
the user can decide to keep S, if he/she notices no change
in the behavior of the application.
Attackers may attempt to put pressure on the Communix
server by sending bursts of fake signatures to the server. The
server processes only up to 10 signatures per day from one
user; beyond this threshold, the signatures from that user are
ignored by the server. This restriction usually does not affect
honest users, since it is unlikely that a user would experience
so many different deadlocks (or different manifestations of a
deadlock) in 1 day. However, the wrongly rejected signatures
can be provided by other users.
In the remainder of this section, we describe in detail the
server-side and client-side signature validation.
2) Server-side Signature Validation: The Communix
server requires each user to accompany the signatures he/she
sends with an encrypted user id that the server provides.
The server provides a unique id to each user; the id is
encrypted, in order to prevent users from manufacturing their
own ids. To be able to share its signatures, each user has
to previously obtain the encrypted id from the Communix
server. The server uses AES encryption, with a predefined
128-bit key, to produce the encrypted user ids. We did not
implement the service for issuing the encrypted user ids;
such a service exceeds the scope of this work. The problem
of preventing attackers from impersonating multiple users
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has been extensively studied.
Upon receiving a signature S accompanied by an en-
crypted id I, the Communix server decrypts I to obtain the
id of the user that sent the signature. After retrieving the
sender id, the server checks whether the same user already
sent a signature S′ which is adjacent to S, i.e., S and S′ have
some (but not all) top frames in common. If the user already
sent a signature adjacent to S, the server refuses to add S to
its database.
Rejecting adjacent signatures from the same user con-
siderably reduces the capability of an attacker to provide
fake signatures. Assume there are N synchronized blocks
(methods) in an application, and there are Nd possible call
stack suffixes of depth d, for each synchronized block
(method). Without this restriction, the attacker can man-
ufacture (N ·Nd)4 signatures of two-thread deadlocks that
pass the validation, for each depth d ≥ 5; this gives a total
of N4 ·
∞
∑
d=5
N4d possible signatures. With this restriction, the
attacker can provide only N signatures.
3) Client-side Signature Validation: For each new signa-
ture S, the Communix agent checks whether S matches the
running Java application, then it checks whether the outer
call stacks of S end in nested synchronized blocks/methods.
For each call stack of signature S, the Communix agent
checks whether the hashes it carries match the running
application A. Each call stack of signature S is encoded as a
sequence of frames [c1.m1 : l1 : h1, ...,cn.mn : ln : hn], where
ci are class names, mi are method names, li are line numbers,
and hi is the hash of class ci’s bytecode. The hashes are
attached by the Communix plugin when Dimmunix produces
signature S. The hash value hk matches application A if and
only if class ck’s bytecode from application A has the hash
hk. The hash check starts from the top frame, i.e., frame
n; if hn does not match A, signature S is rejected. If hk
(1≤ k < n) is the first hash value that does not match A, the
frames 1, ...,k are removed from the call stack; if all hashes
match, the call stack remains unchanged. For efficiency, the
Communix agent computes the hash of a class first time the
class is loaded, then it reuses the computed hash value.
The hash checking covers also the inner call stacks, even
though they are not used by Dimmunix for deadlock avoid-
ance. The signature may correspond to an earlier version
of the application, where the code between the outer and
inner lock statements was deadlock-prone. That code might
have been fixed in a newer version of the application. If the
Communix agent would check only the hashes of the outer
call stacks, these code changes would be missed, and the
false positive signature would pass the validation.
We describe now the algorithm for checking whether
a synchronized block B is nested. Given the control flow
graph (CFG) of an application binary, and the monitorenter
statement s corresponding to a synchronized block, the Com-
munix agent inspects the CFG, starting from the successor
of s. As soon as a monitorenter (monitorexit) statement is
encountered, the algorithm returns that B is nested (non-
nested). If a method call statement scall is met, the algorithm
returns that B is nested, if any method that may be called
(directly on indirectly) by scall is either synchronized or
contains a synchronized block.
Since a synchronized method is semantically equivalent
to a synchronized(this) block that wraps the method body,
the algorithm for checking whether synchronized methods
are nested is similar. In fact, the AspectJ instrumentation
framework [2] that Dimmunix uses transforms the synchro-
nized methods into synchronized blocks.
For efficiency, the Communix agent precomputes the
locations of all the nested synchronized blocks/methods,
when the application runs for the first time. Checking if the
outer call stacks of a signature end in nested synchronized
blocks/methods consists of determining if the top frames
belong to this precomputed set of locations. To inspect the
application bytecode, the Communix agent uses the Soot
bytecode analysis framework [3].
Each time new classes are loaded, in addition to the ones
loaded in the previous runs, the Communix agent repeats the
nesting check for all the signatures from the local repository
that passed the hash check and failed the nesting check.
There is no need to recheck the nesting for the rest of the
signatures, because adding new classes to the CFG can only
uncover new nested synchronized blocks/methods.
D. Signature Generalization
The signature generalization consists of merging different
signatures corresponding to the same deadlock bug, i.e.,
that end in the same inner and outer lock statements. The
resulting signature consists of the longest common suffixes
of the call stacks forming these signatures.
It is important to generalize signatures for the following
reason. If the outer call stack suffixes are long, the signature
may not be able to always avoid the deadlock. In other
words, there may be false negatives, i.e., other signatures
of the same deadlock ending in different outer call stack
suffixes. If there are multiple manifestations of the deadlock
having different outer call stack suffixes, it may take a long
time until a single user experiences all these manifestations.
A trivial solution to avoid all the possible manifestations
of a deadlock would be to match only the top frames
of the signature’s outer call stacks. However, there is an
important drawback to this solution: having the outer call
stacks matched too shallowly introduces false positives [1]
and therefore reduces the parallelism, which may have a
negative impact on performance.
The generalization process is the following: When a
Java application starts, the Communix agent checks if new
signatures that passed the validation could be merged with
existing signatures from the deadlock history of the running
application. The signatures that cannot be merged are added
to the history.
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Two signatures S and S′ can be merged if and only if they
represent the same deadlock bug (i.e., the top frames of S
have to be identical to the top frames of S′), and either (1)
S and S′ were produced on the local machine, or (2) S/S′ is
a remote signature and the resulting signature has the outer
call stacks of depths ≥ 5.
Merging two signatures consists of finding the longest
common call stack suffixes of the two signatures.
Given two signatures S = {(CS1,out,CS1,in), ...} and
S′ = {(CS′1,out,CS′1,in), ...}, their generalization is the
signature Sg = {(CSg1,out,CS
g
1,in), ...}, where CS
g is the
longest common suffix of call stacks CS and CS′.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of Com-
munix (§IV-A), then we evaluate the impact DoS attacks
can have on Java applications running Dimmunix (§IV-B).
Finally, we estimate the time it takes for an application to
achieve full deadlock protection with Communix, compared
to using Dimmunix alone (§IV-C).
The experiments were run on machines with two 4-
core Intel Xeon 2GHz processors each, 20 GB of memory,
running Ubuntu Linux 10.04.
A. Communix’s Performance
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of
the Communix server, then the performance of the whole
signature distribution in an end-to-end setting. Then, we
evaluate the performance of the client-side signature vali-
dation plus the signature generalization. Since the signature
generalization and client-side signature validation are both
performed by the Communix agent at application startup,
we decided to evaluate them together. Finally, we measure
the time it takes for the Communix agent to find the nested
synchronized blocks/methods; the time it takes to compute
the hashes of the loaded classes is negligible compared to
the time it takes to perform the nesting analysis.
The server processes two types of requests: an ADD(sig)
request that means “add signature sig to the database”, and a
GET(k) request that means “send me the signatures from the
database starting from index k”. Normally, a client having a
local repository with n signatures sends GET(n+1) requests
to the server to retrieve the new signatures. We wanted to
evaluate worst case scenarios, therefore we use only GET(0)
requests in our measurements, which means that the server
is always asked to send all its signatures.
To evaluate the server’s performance, we invoke the
request processing routines from 1,000-100,000 simulta-
neous threads. This test measures the efficiency of the
server’s computations, i.e., adding new random signatures
to the database (including the server-side signature vali-
dation) and iterating through the entire database. Figure 2
shows that the server scales well up to 30,000 simultaneous
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Figure 3. The performance of the signature distribution.
“ADD(sig),GET(0)” sequences of requests. At its peak, the
server processes 9,000 requests per second.
We evaluate the performance of the signature distribution
in an end-to-end setting. On one machine we ran the
Communix server, and on another machine we ran 10-200
client threads that send 10 “ADD(sig),GET(0)” sequences of
requests each. Figure 3 shows that the signature distribution
scales well up to 30 client threads, i.e., 300 simultaneous
“ADD(sig),GET(0)” sequences of requests. However, the
throughput (i.e., requests served per second) is up to two
orders of magnitude lower compared to Figure 2. The
explanation is that the network communication between the
server and the client threads becomes a bottleneck. The
size of a signature is 1.7 KB. If there are N client threads
and each thread sent on average k “ADD(sig),GET(0)”
request sequences to the server, the server has to send
(k+1/2)×N2×1.7 KB of data to the N clients, on average,
to serve the next round of GET(0) requests. If N = 200,
the server has to send in the 10th round approximately 630
MB of data to the 200 clients. To summarize, a server with
one network card cannot distribute signatures fast if multiple
clients ask simultaneously for a large number of signatures.
As shown in Figure 3, a client thread receives 20-110
replies per second to “ADD(sig),GET(0)” request sequences,
from the Communix server. Therefore, it takes 9-50 mil-
liseconds to send the two requests to the server and get the
replies. However, the latency of the signature distribution is
up to 1 day, because the Communix client downloads the
new signatures from the Communix server only once a day.
We evaluate the Communix agent on large Java appli-
cations, i.e., JBoss, Limewire, and Vuze. JBoss is a well-
known Java application server, while Limewire and Vuze
are well-known peer-to-peer file sharing applications. For
each application, we measure the time it takes to start
and immediately shut down. In Figure 4, we show the
performance of the computations performed at startup by
the agent, i.e., client-side signature validation and signature
generalization. For up to 1,000 new signatures in the local
repository, the Communix agent incurs a startup delay of up
to 2-3 seconds, i.e., 11-16% startup slowdown.
In Table I, we show the efficiency of the static detection
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Figure 4. The performance of client-side computations, i.e., client-side signature validation and signature generalization.
Table I
STATISTICS ABOUT VARIOUS JAVA APPLICATIONS, AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE NESTING ANALYSIS.
App Size(LOC) Sync
bl/meths
Explicit
sync ops
Nested
(Analyzed)
Nesting
check(sec)
JBoss 636,895 1,898 104 249 (844) 114
Limewire 595,623 1,435 189 277 (781) 122
Vuze 476,702 3,653 14 120 (432) 50
of nested synchronized blocks/methods and some statistics
we collected about the three applications, i.e., size in lines
of code (LOC), number of synchronized blocks/methods,
number of explicit lock/unlock operations (i.e., calls to
ReentrantLock.lock/unlock()), and the number of nested syn-
chronized blocks/methods that the nesting analysis reports.
The Communix agent could analyze only 11-54% of the syn-
chronized blocks/methods. For the rest of the synchronized
blocks/methods, the Soot static analysis framework could not
retrieve enough information for the nesting analysis (i.e.,
it could not retrieve the CFGs of some of the methods).
Table I shows that it takes 50-122 seconds to analyze
432-844 synchronized blocks/methods. The nesting analysis
is performed at shutdown, first time the application runs,
and each time new classes (w.r.t. the previous run) are
loaded. Therefore, the analysis is performed only for the first
couple of runs. Moreover, since the analysis is performed at
shutdown, the delay is not bothersome for the user, if the
user does not intend to restart the application soon.
B. The Impact of DoS Attacks
The attackers have only one way to exploit Dimmunix,
to slow down a Java application: they can send signatures
with outer call stacks of depth 5 which cover all the nested
synchronized blocks/methods that are on the critical path,
in order to maximize the amount of thread serialization
in applications running Dimmunix. If there is already a
signature S in the deadlock history that can be merged with
a malicious signature S′, signature S′ will replace S in the
history, by exploiting the generalization mechanism.
Table II shows that attackers providing malicious deadlock
signatures can cause only 8-40% performance overhead in
the studied real applications running with Dimmunix. The
tests run with 20 deadlock signatures in the history, with
outer call stacks of depth 5. These outer calls are on the
critical path, i.e., more than 99% of the nested synchronized
blocks/methods are executed with these call stacks. In this
worst case scenario, the performance overhead incurred
by Dimmunix is 8-40%, which is acceptable for general-
purpose applications. If none of the signatures is on the crit-
ical path, the performance overhead incurred by Dimmunix
is negligible (i.e., < 2%). For outer call stacks of depth 1,
the performance overhead is considerable (i.e., > 100%), for
some of the applications we studied. However, this situation
is avoided, because the Communix agent does not accept
incoming signatures with outer call stacks of depth < 5.
Therefore, Communix successfully contains DoS attacks.
Table II
WORST CASE OVERHEAD INCURRED WHILE UNDER A DOS ATTACK.
Application Benchmark/Test Overhead
JBoss RUBiS 40%
MySQL JDBC JDBCBench 38%
Eclipse Startup + Shutdown 33%
Limewire Upload test 10%
Vuze Startup + Shutdown 8%
Making it hard for a user to obtain multiple encrypted
ids from the Communix server, together with restricting the
server to process only up to 10 signatures per day for the
same user id, protects the server and the clients against
flooding with fake signatures. Assuming 100 attackers man-
age to obtain 5 ids each from the server, and they keep
sending fake signatures to the server, the attackers could
make the server process and add to its database only up
to 100 ∗ 5 ∗ 10 = 5,000 signatures in 1 day. Assuming the
worst case, i.e., the 5,000 signatures are sent simultaneously
by the 100 attackers, the server can process the signatures in
1 second, the Communix client can download them in a few
minutes, and the agent can process them in 10-15 seconds.
C. Time to Achieve Full Protection Against Deadlocks
As we mentioned in §III-D, it may take a long time for a
single user to experience all the deadlocks of an application
and all the manifestations of these deadlocks. Therefore, it
may take a long time until Dimmunix alone can provide full
protection against deadlocks.
If there are many users of an application A, Communix
can considerably reduce the time it takes for A to be
deadlock-free. The time it takes for Communix to provide
full protection against deadlocks for application A is in-
versely proportional to the number Nu of users that run
A in different ways. If there are Nd possible deadlock
manifestations in A and it takes on average t days for a
user to experience one manifestation, A will be deadlock-
free in roughly t ∗Nd days, if Dimmunix alone is used. If
Communix is used, all the users of A will have A deadlock-
free in roughly t ∗Nd/Nu days. The larger Nu, the higher the
7
gain that Communix brings.
The estimate we made here is purely theoretical. A real
evaluation is possible only if Communix is deployed in the
field and statistics are collected after a considerable period
of usage (e.g., months) from many (e.g., thousands) users.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the literature on approaches to
avoiding application failures.
Static analysis tools look for bugs at compile time, helping
programmers remove them. ESC [4] uses a theorem prover
and relies on knowledge from annotations generated by
Houdini [5]. Larochelle et al. [6] presents an approach
to detect vulnerabilities through a source code analysis.
Relay [7] and KLEE [8] use symbolic execution to statically
detect bugs in applications; however, exponential growth of
execution paths limits scalability of the symbolic execution.
RacerX [9] provides a static flow-sensitive, interprocedural
analysis to detect deadlocks. Static analysis tools can run
fast, avoid runtime overhead, and help prevent deadlocks.
However, they produce false positives, and it is ultimately
the programmers’ burden to find the true positives.
Dynamic bug detection is conceptually observing the pro-
gram execution to extract various kinds of information. Nir-
Buchbinder et al. [10] dynamically discover deadlocks and
instrument the code using a “gate lock” to prevent similar
deadlocks in the future. [11] serializes threads’ access to
lock sets that could induce deadlocks. GoodLock [12], [13]
detects deadlocks by recording the nested locking pattern for
each thread. Rx [14] rolls back to a checkpoint upon dead-
lock and retries the execution in a modified environment.
Machine learning techniques are also used for dynamic bug
detection. ClearView [15] instruments the applications to
dynamically profile the execution flows. ClearView employs
the profiles to distinguish erroneous executions later.
Fingerprinting the anomalous execution signatures en-
ables applications to avoid reoccurrences of bugs in the
future. Bouncer [16], using DFI [17] for dynamic bug detec-
tion, generates signatures to block exploits before they get
processed by the program. Snort [18] provides a signature-
based exploit detection, saving attack signatures once a new
attack is detected. The manual generation of the signatures
limits Snort’s scalability.
Finally, there exist approaches addressing cooperative
security (dependability). In particular, once a bad execution
pattern is detected and its corresponding signature is gen-
erated, the application helps its peers by broadcasting the
signature to its neighbors. Vigilante [19] proposes an end-
to-end approach to contain worms automatically. It relies
on collaborative worm detection at end hosts, but does not
require hosts to trust each other. Communix differs from
Vigilante in the validation of the received bug signatures:
Vigilante uses replay to validate a new signature, while
Communix efficiently checks deadlock signatures statically.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented Communix, a collaborative deadlock
immunity framework that targets deadlock bugs in general-
purpose Java applications. Communix complements Dimmu-
nix [1]. Dimmunix fingerprints the execution flows leading
to deadlocks, then Communix sends these fingerprints (sig-
natures) to a deadlock immunity server that makes them
available to all nodes in the Internet. A Communix agent
running within Dimmunix selects the new signatures that
match the running Java application. The accepted signatures
are stored and used to prevent deadlocks. An important
contribution of Communix is that it uses the collective
knowledge of all nodes in the Internet running the same
application, to improve the protection against deadlocks for
each individual node running that application. Communix is
efficient and scalable: the server can process up to 9,000
requests per second, and the agent can validate 1,000 new
signatures in 2-3 seconds, while managing to contain DoS
attacks. This makes Communix an attractive framework for
providing collaborative immunity against deadlock bugs.
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